内生模型下财政分权对政府规模的影响机制——支出端分权与地方政府规模的非线性关系

Intrinsic Mechanism of Fiscal Decentralization’s Effect on Government Size——Threshold Effect Matters

本文旨在从理论和实证两个方面探究财政分权对政府规模影响的内在机制。研究表明,从中央政府角度看,财权下放不利于控制中央政府规模,而事权下放表现出显著的正向作用;从地方政府角度看,收入端分权有利于控制地方政府规模,但支出端分权和地方政府规模呈非线性关系,并依据转移支付依赖度、公共支出结构参数和地方性公共品供给能力呈现不同程度的门槛效应,这一效应对控制地方政府规模具有重要的指导意义。

We aim to explore mechanism of fiscal decentralization’s impact on government scale in this paper. We apply general endogenous growth model and test the relationship with Chinese 1994-2015 panel data, and find that the effect of revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization on government size is totally different. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the scale of decentralization and local government spending end relationship is nonlinear, and the result depends on the transfer payment dependence, public expenditure structure parameters and the local public goods supply capacity.