《杨朱篇》的道德虚无主义

The moral nihilism of Yang Zhu Chapter

《列子·杨朱篇》在反名教倡自然的魏晋玄学思潮中系统地提出了一种道德虚无主义。《杨朱篇》在名义上所反对或否定的是儒家的纲常名教,但其实质可以看作是对一般人类道德的普遍否定。《杨朱篇》提出实名贫而伪名富,即追求实利为真正有价值的追求,而追求名教道德则有损人生享乐。《杨朱篇》认为道德与人性的追求,在历史面前区分善恶没有意义,死亡抹去了人生的一切价值区别,也抹去了道德的区别。《杨朱篇》的论证,没有意识到道德并非因为时过境迁或因为人的死亡而没有价值,道德的价值在于维持人类的生活秩序和使人过着美善的生活。并且,人类的道德并非因为个体的暂在性而没有意义和价值,人类的道德文化不断地通过个体而传递下去,因而人类的道德文化在任何个体那里同样具有历史意义和价值。

Yang ZhuChapter of Liezi systematically presents a kind of moral nihilism among the metaphysical thinking of the Wei and Jin Dynasties which goes against the Confucian ethnical code and advocates love of nature.Though on the surface the Chapter opposes or denies the Confucian code,essentially it represents a denial of human morality in general.The Chapter suggests that the pursuit of real profit or shiming(实名)is worthwhile,while the pursuit of morality or weiming(伪名)harms the enjoyment of life.It argues that the pursuit of morality and humanity is meaningless in front of history,and that death erases all efforts to pursue what is valuable and moral.The Chapter,through the above mentioned arguments,fails to realize that it is not the passage of time or death that erases the value of morality.Rather,the value of morality is to maintain the order of human life and to enable human beings to live a life of virtue and beauty.Moreover,morality is not devoid of meaning and value because of the transient existence of an individual.It is just because of the survival of the moral culture of humanity through the existence of each individual that it finds its historical significance and value in each individual person.