货币政策适度性、银行信贷歧视与非金融企业杠杆分化

Monetary Policy Moderation,Bank Credit Discrimination and Leverage Differentiation of Non-financial Enterprises

本文利用2007—2017年非金融类上市公司数据,系统性地分析了银行信贷歧视背景下,货币政策对非金融企业杠杆分化的影响。结果显示,银行信贷歧视会放大国有企业和非国有企业杠杆分化现象,并且这种效应在存在政治关联和政府补贴的企业以及经济资源市场化配置程度较低、行政审批程序繁琐、融资成本高的地区更为显著。相较于适度宽松的货币政策,紧缩性货币政策会进一步放大国有企业和非国有企业之间的杠杆分化程度,而货币政策适度性、银行家信心指数以及央行沟通有效性的提高,在一定程度上会弱化货币政策紧缩对国有企业和非国有企业杠杆分化的正向影响。进一步讨论发现,无论在货币政策宽松时期还是紧缩时期,银行信贷歧视都会放大国有企业和非国有企业之间的金融性杠杆分化程度,而对经营性杠杆分化作用并不显著,即从资金去向角度识别出我国现阶段非金融企业金融化和经济"脱实向虚"现象的存在。

Based on the data of non-financial listed enterprises from 2007 to 2017 and the context of bank credit discrimination,this paper analyzes the impact of monetary policy on the leverage differentiation of non-financial enterprises. The results show that bank credit discrimination will enlarge the leverage differentiation between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. This effect is more significant in the enterprises with political connections and government subsidies. It is also stronger in regions with low marketization,inefficient government administration and high financing cost. Compared with the looser policy,tight monetary policy will enlarge the leverage differentiation. However,the improvement of monetary policy moderation,banker confidence and effectiveness of central bank communication will weaken the effect of monetary policy on leverage differentiation. Further discussions find that bank credit discrimination will enlarge financial leverage differentiation,but has no significant effect on operational one,no matter the monetary policy is loose or tight. Therefore,from the perspective of fund using,this paper identifies the financialization of non-financial enterprises and the phenomenon "economy divorce from entity to virtual"at this stage.