演化博弈视角下的城市空气污染地方治理研究

Research on Local Governance of Urban Air Pollution from the Perspective of Evolutionary

通过构建地方政府—企业—社会公众的三方演化博弈模型,深入研究财政分权背景下城市空气污染地方治理系统的运行机制,探明治理主体策略选择的作用机理和演化过程,并通过求解复制动态方程的稳定点,阐释不同政策取向下地方治理体系的作用效率与演化路径。进而使用MATLAB软件对情形1(积极监督、不治理、不参与)与情形2(积极监督、治理、参与)进行数值仿真。研究表明企业是演化速度最快的主体,且情形2实现演化均衡的时间更长,表明要实现地方主体的协同治理需更长的时间和更复杂的过程,而过度的行政介入则会抑制社会主体的参与。此外,还通过对混合策略均衡的参数敏感性分析,发现提高中央对地方监管的奖惩水平、增加政府对企业的治理补贴与税收优惠、适度提高行政罚款、强化社会对政府与企业的声誉评价、加大公众的损失赔偿与监督激励均能促使治理主体选择积极的行动策略,同时公众监督与政府监管之间还存在一定的替代关系。据此,提出理顺央地权责关系、合理运用环境规制工具、培育环境协同治理意识等政策建议,以此增强地方政府监管的正向预期、培育企业治理的自主能力以及夯实社会监督的制度基础,持续提升城市空气污染的治理绩效。

Construct a tripartite game model of local government,enterprise and public.Study the operation mechanism of urban air local governance system under the background of fiscal decentralization,discuss the mechanism and evolution process of governance subject strategy selection,and explain the efficiency and evolution path of local governance system under different policy orientations by solving the stable point of replication dynamic process.Case 1 and case 2 are selected for numerical simulation.It is found that the enterprise is the subject with the fastest evolution speed,and case 2 has a longer time to achieve evolution equilibrium.It shows that it takes longer and more complex process realizing the coordination of local subjects,and the excessive administrative intervention will inhibit the participation of other subjects.In addition,through the parameter sensitivity analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium,It is found that improving the level of rewards and punishments of the central government for local government governance,increasing the level of government subsidies and tax preferences for enterprises,moderately improving the administrative fines and supervision,strengthening the reputation evaluation of the government and enterprises by the society,and increasing the rewards and losses compensation for public participation in governance can promote the governance owners.Meanwhile,effective public participation can also replace part of the government’s supervision function.On the basis,some policy suggestions are put forward,such as straightening out the power and responsibility relationship between the central government and the local government,rationally using environmental regulation tools,and fostering the awareness of coordinated environmental governance,so as to enhance the positive expectation of local government regulation,cultivate enterprises’self-governance ability,consolidate the institutional foundation of social supervision,and continuously improve the governance performance of urban air pollution.