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虚拟电厂的灵活性辅助服务投标策略研究 被引量:2

Research on Flexible Auxiliary Service Bidding Strategy of Virtual Power Plant
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摘要 虚拟电厂(VPP)作为灵活性辅助服务商,有助于缓解可再生能源的不确定性给电网带来的影响。由于VPP在灵活性辅助投标过程中,其内部风电预测出力和实际出力具有偏差性。因此,为了降低VPP参与灵活性投标出力受到偏差惩罚和投标风险,采用鲁棒优化法处理风电出力的不确定性。将不确定风电出力限制在一个确定区间内,通过调节鲁棒系数得出不同优化投标方案。由于VPP在提供能量与灵活性辅助时在容量上存在耦合效应,建立了VPP同时参与能量–辅助服务市场鲁棒随机投标模型,提高VPP的实际利润。算例分析证明了鲁棒随机投标模型的有效性。 As a flexible auxiliary service provider,virtual power plant(VPP)helps to mitigate the impact of renewable energy uncertainty on power grid.In order to reduce the deviation penalty and bidding risk of VPP participating in flexible bidding,robust optimization method is adopted to deal with the uncertainty of wind power output.The uncertain wind power output is limited to a certain interval,and different optimal bidding schemes are given by adjusting the robust coefficient.Due to the coupling effect in capacity when VPP provides energy and flexibility ancillary services,this paper establishes a robust stochastic bidding model for VPP to participate in the energy provision and ancillary service market at the same time,so as to improve the actual profit of VPP.The effectiveness of the robust stochastic bidding model is proved by an example.
作者 张巍 李怀宝 董晓伟 王俊翔 刘若瑶 ZHANG Wei;LI Huaibao;DONG Xiaowei;WANG Junxiang;LIU Ruoyao(School of Mechanical Engineering,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)
出处 《电力科学与工程》 2021年第3期47-56,共10页 Electric Power Science and Engineering
关键词 虚拟电厂 灵活性辅助服务 鲁棒优化 投标策略 virtual power plant flexible ancillary services robust optimization bidding strategy
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