基于委托代理理论模型在反洗钱工作激励机制应用研究

Research on the Application of Incentive Mechanism of Anti-money Laundering Based on Principal-agent Theory Model

委托代理理论是指在非对称信息经济学中,在委托人和代理人信息不对称的情况下,对激励机制求解的最佳契约方案。本文以该理论为基础,将反洗钱工作中监管机构与义务机构之间通过委托代理关系模型化,通过对该模型最优解的求解,分析反洗钱工作中监管机构对反洗钱义务机构最优的激励机制,以此来达到督促义务机构履职积极性的目的,进而达到提升反洗钱工作有效性的目的。

Principal-agent theory refers to the optimal contract solution for the incentive mechanism under the condition of information asymmetry between principal and agent in asymmetric information economics.Based on this theory,this paper models the anti-money laundering work through the principal-agent relationship between regulators and compulsory institutional,through to the model,to solve the optimal solution of the analysis of regulators in anti-money laundering work of anti-money laundering obligations mechanism of optimal incentive mechanism,in order to achieve the purpose of motivating compulsory agency started,and thus achieve the goal of ascension anti-money laundering work eff ectiveness.