管理层能力与年报柔性监管——基于年报问询函收函和回函视角的研究

Managerial Ability and Flexible Regulation——Evidence from Comment Letters Receiving and Response

柔性监管作为一种事中监管模式,在提升上市公司质量、促进信息披露的合规性和有效性层面发挥着重要的作用。本文利用交易所的年报问询函制度,研究管理层能力对于上市公司收到问询函概率和回复内容可读性的影响。结果表明:管理层能力与公司收函概率呈U型关系;同时,高能力管理层的回函可读性更高,且更有利于缓解被问询的负面市场反应。我们的研究表明,年报问询函这一柔性监管政策能有效激励高能力管理者披露补充性信息,弥补由于管理层机会主义动机导致的信息披露不足。

As an in-process supervision, flexible regulation plays an important role in improving the quality of listed companies and promoting the compliance and effectiveness of information disclosure. This paper investigates the effects of managerial ability on comment letters receiving and response to comment letters for financial reporting. The result shows that there is a U-shaped relationship between managerial ability and the company’s probability of receiving comment letters. In addition, there is a positive relation between managerial ability and response readability, response of high-ability management are more readable, and are more conducive to alleviating the negative market reaction of being inquired. Our results indicate that comment letter as a flexible regulatory policy can effectively stimulate capable managers to disclose more supplementary information to compensate the inadequacy disclosure due to management’s opportunism.