补贴退坡-双积分政策下两级供应链生产决策优化分析

Production Decision Optimizing Analysis of Two-level Supply Chain under Subsidy Back-slope and Double Integral Policy

在退坡与双积分政策下,分析由一个车企和一个分销商组成的两级供应链中的生产决策问题。基于Stackelberg博弈,阐释退坡和双积分对车企与分销商最优决策的影响。对比分析集中决策和分散决策对供应链绩效的影响,帮助汽车供应链有效适应“双积分”政策。研究表明:在双积分政策未实施时,随着补贴的不断降低,新能源汽车的需求量、车企的利润会随之降低;双积分政策实施之后,车企不断提高研发努力水平可使新能源汽车的需求量提高,车企与分销商的利润可获得帕累托改进。数值分析表明,双积分政策可以有效促进新能源汽车的发展。

Under the policy of regression and Double Integral,we focus on a production decision-making problem for a two-level supply chain composed of an automobile manufacturer and a distributor.Based on Stackelberg game,we analyze the impact of downhill and Double Integral policy on optimal decision-making of automobile manufacturers and distributors.In order to help automobile supply chain in the Double Integral policy,we also compare the supply chain performance in the centralized and decentralized decision-making.The research shows that when the Double Integral policy is not implemented,the demand for new energy vehicles and the profit of manufacturers will decrease with the decrease of subsidies.After the implementation of the Double Integral policy,the demand for new energy vehicles increases by the continuous improvement of R&D efforts of automobile manufacturers,and Pareto Improvement is obtained on the profits of manufacturers and distributors.The numerical analysis shows that the Double Integral policy can effectively promote the development of new energy vehicles.