摘要
针对传统减排补贴激励政策的突出矛盾,本文借助委托代理理论并从激励相容约束和参与约束条件的角度出发解析政府如何有效地设计优化减排补贴政策,以此为基础分析了政府最优减排补贴政策的激励效应:首先,基于最优发电量的最大减排量确定政府对增加环境经济效益和节约电煤消耗量的社会福利的平衡系数在减排水平对电能生产强弱敏感条件下的最大临界值和最小临界值;其次,以临界最值为基准,基于发电商最优收益分析在强弱敏感条件下减排补贴政策存在负向激励效应的合理性和可靠性;最后,基于政府最优减排补贴成本分析在强弱敏感条件下减排补贴政策对发电商所产生的正向激励效应。研究结论为燃煤发电区域政府科学引导可再生能源发电商积极参与减排合作而制定有效的减排补贴激励政策提供了决策依据和管理启示。
In view of prominent contradiction of the traditional emission reduction subsidy incentive policy,this paper analyzes how the government effectively designs and optimizes the emission reduction subsidy policy from the perspective of incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraint condition.On this basis,the incentive effect of the government's optimal emission reduction subsidy policy under different circumstances is numerically analyzed:Firstly,based on the maximum emission reduction of optimal power generation,the maximum critical value and minimum critical value of the government's equilibrium coefficient for social welfare of increasing environmental economic benefits and saving electricity and coal consumption are determined under the condition that the emission reduction level is sensitive to the intensity of electricity production.Secondly,the rationality and reliability of the negative incentive effect of emission reduction subsidy policy under the condition of strong or weak sensitivity are analyzed based on the optimal benefit of the power generators with the critical minimum value as the benchmark.Finally,based on the cost analysis of the government's optimal emission reduction subsidy,this paper analyzes the positive incentive effect of emission reduction subsidy policy on power generators under the sensitive condition of strength and weakness.The conclusion of this study provides decision-making basis and management enlightenment for the governments of coal-fired power generation regions to scientifically guide renewable energy generators to participate in emission reduction cooperation actively and formulate effective emission reduction subsidy incentive policies.
作者
商波
黄涛珍
SHANG Bo;HUANG Tao-zhen(School of Business,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China;School of Public Administration,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第3期151-158,共8页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金重点支持项目(91747208)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(B200203169)
江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX20_0511)。
关键词
燃煤发电区域政府
可再生能源发电商
减排补贴
委托代理
激励效应
regional governments for coal-fired power generation
renewable energy generators
emission reduction subsidies
principal agent
incentive effect