考虑企业释放质量信号行为的产品推广策略

Product Promotion Considering Quality Signal Releasing

为吸引消费者,一些企业尝试以释放质量信号为手段进行产品推广。本文考虑消费者购买时的参考效用,通过构建模型,探讨了短期经营下低质量企业不释放质量信号、短期经营下低质量企业释放质量信号、长期经营下低质量企业不释放质量信号和长期经营下低质量企业释放质量信号等四种情况下的产品定价策略,并分析了释放质量信号对企业运营带来的利弊。研究发现:长期经营下低质量企业释放质量信号时,产品质量差距的扩大将提高竞争企业的最优定价,而释放质量信号程度的增加则将使最优定价降低。同时,通过释放质量信号,短期内低质量企业看似可以借此获得大量需求,但现实中可行性不高。从长期经营来看,以释放质量信号为手段的推广策略实际上会损害整个市场的利益。

At present,some firms try to promote products by the method of releasing quality signal,which creates the situation in which the product is very popular.However,is it really beneficial for firms?In this paper,considering consumers’reference-dependent utility,we study the optimal price in four cases,including low-end firm not releasing quality signal in short-run business,low-end firm releasing quality signal in short-run business,low-end firm not releasing quality signal in long-run business,and low-end firm releasing quality signal in long-run business(LD).Then we analyze howreference-dependent utility and releasing have an effect on this promotion strategy.We find that in the case of LD,product price increases with quality difference but decreases with the level of quality signal releasing.Moreover,releasing helps low-end firms to increase demand in short-term.Therefore,releasing is beneficial for firms whose consumers will never return,such as shops in tourist attractions.However,in long-run business,this promotion strategy will hurt the whole market.