产学研协同创新联盟稳定性与政策设计研究

Research on the Stability and Policy Design of Industry-University-Research Collaborative Innovation Alliance

产学研形成协同创新联盟是推进国家创新驱动发展战略的重要手段之一,为了探查创新效率、技术溢出、产出弹性以及政府扶持和评估收益等因素对协同创新联盟形成的影响,本文构建了企业与学研之间的演化博弈模型,模型解析和数值仿真结果表明:当创新效率和技术溢出较低时,企业缺乏形成协同创新联盟的意愿,学研虽然有意愿形成协同创新联盟,但积极性不高;当创新效率和技术溢出逐渐提高时,双方形成协同创新联盟,且学研的意愿更强;当产出弹性较低时,企业和学研都没有意愿形成协同创新联盟;当产出弹性提高到一定程度时,双方才能形成协同创新联盟,且学研的意愿更强;当政府扶持以及评估收益均较低时,企业没有意愿形成协同创新联盟,学研虽有意愿形成协同创新联盟,但积极性不高;当政府扶持以及评估收益逐渐提高时,双方形成协同创新联盟,政府扶持力度显著则学研的意愿更强,政府评估收益提高显著则企业的意愿更强。

The formation of collaborative innovation alliances by industry,university,and research is one of the important means to promote the national innovation-driven development strategy.In order to explore the impact of innovation efficiency,technology spillover,output flexibility,and government support and evaluation payoff on the formation of collaborative innovation alliances,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between enterprises and university-research.Our model analysis and numerical simulation results show that,when innovation efficiency and technology spillover are low,enterprises lack the willingness to form collaborative innovation alliances.Although university-research has the willingness to form collaborative innovation alliances,they are not very motivated.When innovation efficiency and technology spillover are gradually increasing,the two sides form a collaborative innovation alliance,and the willingness of university-research is stronger.When the output flexibility is low,neither the enterprise nor the university-research is willing to form a collaborative innovation alliance.Only when the output elasticity is increased to a certain level,the two game players can form a collaborative innovation alliance,the willingness of the university-research is stronger.When government support and evaluation payoff are both low,enterprises are not willing to form collaborative innovation alliances.Although university-research are willing to form collaborative innovation alliances,their enthusiasm is not high.When government support and government evaluation payoff gradually increase,the two sides form a collaborative innovation alliance.If government support increases significantly,the willingness of university-research is stronger.If government evaluation payoff improves significantly,the willingness of enterprises is stronger.