期刊文献+

共享经济中基于排序博弈的单资源供需匹配效率研究 被引量:7

The Supply-Demand Matching Efficiency of Single Resource Based on Sequencing Game in Sharing Economy
原文传递
导出
摘要 以单共享资源为背景,允许自利的需求个体具有不同的正规型或非正规型目标,采用排序博弈研究共享各方在无秩序代价(Price of Anarchy,POA)衡量下的供需匹配程度。对于多人多目标模型,先证明一般意义下以及满足EDD规则的Nash均衡和Pareto解有相同的POA,继而给出了两种不同共享方指标下的POA的解析表达,并进行了对比分析。研究发现:非正规型客户是导致共享经济中供需失配的关键因素之一,但其给两种共享方指标下的供需匹配带来的影响是不同的,且与直觉相反,Pareto改进以及EDD规则并不能带来改善。这些发现对于解释共享经济中供需匹配机理并提升共享效率有着重要的指导意义。 Based on single shared resource,supply-demand matching could be evaluated by the Price of Anarchy(POA),which were studied by utilizing sequencing game,considering multiple selfish tasks had different regular or non-regular objectives. For such multi-person multi-objective model, it was proved that the general Nash Equilibrium solutions, Pareto solutions, and the corresponding solutions satisfying EDD rule had the same POA.Two POAs under two objectives of shared resource providers were given and compared.It was found that non-regularity was one of the key elements to deteriorate the supply-demand match,but its impacts on supply-demand match were different under two objectives of resource providers. Moreover,it was counter-intuitive that Pareto improvement and EDD rule could not alleviate these impacts.These findings could help to explain the matching mechanism of supply-demand in sharing economics and improve the sharing efficiency.
作者 王长军 吴琼 WANG Changjun;WU Qiong(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China;School of Economics and Management,Chuzhou University,Chuzhou 239000,China)
出处 《工业工程与管理》 北大核心 2021年第1期165-173,共9页 Industrial Engineering and Management
基金 上海市哲学社会科学规划基金项目(2019BGL036)。
关键词 共享经济 排序博弈 无秩序代价 NASH均衡 PARETO EDD Sharing economics Sequencing game Price of Anarchy Nash Equilibrium Pareto EDD
  • 相关文献

参考文献6

二级参考文献65

  • 1WANGChang-Jun XIYu-Geng.Modeling and Analysis of Single Machine Scheduling Based on Noncooperative Game Theory[J].自动化学报,2005,31(4):516-522. 被引量:3
  • 2冯大光,唐立新.具有最大总加权满意度的单机调度问题的dynasearch算法[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(4):40-50. 被引量:3
  • 3李丹,吴建平,崔勇.应用层组播用户的自私性研究[J].软件学报,2007,18(3):625-635. 被引量:4
  • 4Koutsoupias E,Papadimitriou C.Worst-case Equilibria[C] //Proceeding of The 16th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science,Springer-Verlag,1999:404-413.
  • 5Owen G.Game Theory[M].Third Edition.San Diego:Academic Press Inc,1995.
  • 6Georgia P,Guillaume R.The price of anarchy in supply chains:Quantifying the efficiency of price-only contracts[J].Management Science,2007,53(8):1249-1268.
  • 7Han D R,Yang H.The multi-class,multi-criterion traffic equilibrium and the efficiency of congestion pricing[J].Transportation Research,Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review,2008,44(5):753-773.
  • 8Haviv M,Roughgarden T.The price of anarchy in an exponential multi-server[J].Operations Research Letters,2007,35(4):421-426.
  • 9Pedro C C,Arantza E,et al.Job scheduling,cooperation,and control[J].Operations Research Letters,2006,34(1):22-28.
  • 10Fischer S,Vocking B.On the structure and complexity of worst-case equilibria[J].Theoretical Computer Science,2007,378:165-174.

共引文献48

同被引文献131

引证文献7

二级引证文献16

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部