政府激励下小微水体治理参与方行为演化博弈分析

Game Analysis on the Behavior Evolution of Micro Water Bodies Under Government Incentive

黄河流域河湖支流的“四乱”是黄河流域生态保护和高质量发展过程中所必须面临的问题。针对这些问题,为更好发挥河湖长制的工作成效,以政府激励下各方利益均衡为目标,构造上级政府、基层河长、公众三方演化博弈的模型。通过实例数据对模型进行仿真,得出:①相比于公众监督,上级政府更能影响基层河长治理策略的选择;②政府政策成本减少至合理的数值以下会使三方博弈稳定于最优策略;③上级政府对基层河长的奖励要比惩罚更能调动基层河长治河积极性;④公众监督基层河长所受到奖励的增加会促进基层河长积极治理。对小微水体治理中博弈各方提出了相应建议。

The“four chaos”problem in the tributaries of the Yellow River Basin is a difficult problem in the process of ecological protection and high⁃quality development in the Yellow River Basin.In view of these problems,in order to give full play to the effectiveness of the system,this paper took the interests balance of all parties under the government incentive as the goal,and constructed the evolutionary game model of government at a higher level,the grass⁃roots river chiefs and the public.The results show that:a)Compared with the public supervision,the government at a higher level is more able to influence the choice of grass⁃roots river management strategy.b)Reducing the government policy cost to a reasonable value will make the tripartite game stable in the optimal strategy.c)The government at a higher level rewards to the grass⁃roots river chiefs is better than the punishment for mobilizing the enthusiasm of the grass⁃roots river chiefs.d)The increase of rewards for public supervision of grass⁃roots river chiefs will promote the active management of grass⁃roots river chiefs.Finally,according to the relevant conclusions,the corresponding control suggestions are put forward for the game parties in the treatment of small and micro water bodies.