家庭预算约束与车牌分配机制的福利分析

Welfare Analysis of Automobile License Allocation Mechanisms with Budget-Constrained Agents

以北京和上海的车牌限额政策为研究对象,分析多种可能的家庭预算约束下三种车牌分配机制的配置效率。当均衡竞拍价格由预算和车牌使用价值共同决定时,在配置效率上,允许二次交易的摇号优于拍卖,而拍卖优于禁止二次交易的摇号;当均衡只由预算决定时,允许二次交易的摇号最优,而另外两者的配置效率相同;当均衡只由使用价值决定时,允许二次交易的摇号和拍卖都能实现社会福利最优的配置,其有效性高于禁止二次交易的摇号。

This study tries to analyze the efficiency of automobile license allocation mechanisms with budget-constrained agents. When the competitive price is determined by the budget-constraint and valuation, the random assignment with resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of efficiency, and the random assignment without resale is the worst. When the competitive price only relies on the budget-constraint, the random assignment with resale may outperform the competitive market, and the other two are equivalent in efficiency. When the competitive price only relies on the valuation, both of the random assignment with resale and the competitive market can reach the social optimum, and they outperform the random assignment without resale.