基于参照点的产学研知识产权冲突协调契约设计

Contract Design for Intellectual Property Conflict Coordination of Industry-University-Institute Cooperation Based on Reference Point

产学研合作中,企业方和学研方由于主体异质性,容易引发知识产权冲突,从而导致效率损失或合作破裂。对此,本文采用不完全契约理论下的参照点契约理论框架,选择实践中知识产权交易价格和知识产权成果价值两个矛盾集中点入手,基于契约参照点偏差,引入企业方和学研方在议价能力、价值认知及折减行为上的不对称假定,从事前知识产权的最优分配、事后自我履约价格区间求解以及事后最优知识产权交易价格的选取三个方面,建立了参照点契约模型,对产学研研发合作契约进行优化设计。研究表明,创新知识产权份额的分配将对产学研合作整体效率产生影响,签订弹性价格契约有助于事后价格位于自我履约区间内,从而在一定程度上提高事后效率,但仍不能完全避免折减行为,需优化选取事后价格以实现产学研合作整体效率的最优。

In the context of China’s innovation-driven strategy,industry-university-institute cooperation has become an important path to improve China’s self-innovation capability.However,due to agent heterogeneity and information asymmetry,corporate parties and academic counterparts may dissent on certain core research and development achievements,namely intellectual property conflicts,which can lead to loss of efficiency and breakdown of cooperation.In this regard,two most controversial value conflicts--value of intellectual property transaction prices and the value of intellectual property rights are selected as pointcut of this paper which involve the core interests in practice of the intellectual property conflict of both parties.In this paper,the optimal division of intellectual property and design of intellectual property transaction contract in industry-university-institute cooperation are analyzed through building reference point contract model based on incomplete contract theory.In this model,asymmetry assumptions of bargaining power,value cognition and reduction behavior of enterprises and institutions are adopted rather than symmetry hypothesis in traditional research because of misaligned reference points.The perspectives of optimal ex ante intellectual property allocation is calculated,ex post self-enforcing price range solution and ex post intellectual property transaction prices selection are solved.Based on the allowable variation range of parameters,the initial value of model parameter is chosen randomly and makes a simulation.Simulation results validate model conclusions.Research suggests that changes in the allocation of innovation intellectual property rights will have an impact on the overall efficiency of the industry-university-research collaboration.Flexible price contract assists ex post prices to vary within self-compliance interval and thus improves ex post efficiency.However,it cannot completely avoid the reduction conducts.Therefore,optimizing the selection of ex post prices is needed to achieve the overall optimal efficiency of industry-university-institute cooperation.The conclusions can be used for solving the core intellectual property conflicts in the industry-university-institute cooperation,as well as the property rights distribution and transaction contract mechanism design of innovation cooperation against the background of subject heterogeneity.