政府动态奖惩机制下绿色建筑供给侧演化博弈研究

Study on the Supply Side Evolutionary Game of Green Building under the Mechanism of Government Dynamic Reward and Punishment

从绿色建筑供给侧角度出发,构建消费者效用函数、开发商利润函数和政府与开发商的演化博弈模型,分析消费者绿色偏好、建筑绿色度、成本等因素对建筑价格、需求和利润的影响以及政府动态奖惩政策下系统的演化稳定策略。结果表明:消费者绿色偏好支付系数和建筑绿色度的增大有利于绿色建筑价格、需求和利润的提高,但高成本却使需求和利润降低;政府采用静态补贴与静态税收政策时,博弈系统不存在演化稳定策略,采用动态补贴与静态税收、静态补贴与动态税收、动态补贴与动态税收三种政策组合时,系统存在演化稳定策略;动态补贴与静态税收的政策组合在推动绿色建筑发展方面优于其他政策;开发商开发绿色建筑的概率与补贴上限值呈负相关,与税收上限值呈正相关。

In order to promote the development of green building in China,the consumer’s utility function,the developer’s profit function and the evolutionary game model between government and developer are constructed,analyzing the influence of consumer’s green preference,green degree and development cost of the building on the price,demand and profit of green buildings and ordinary buildings,meanwhile,finding out the evolutionary stable strategies of the game system under the four dynamic reward and punishment policies of the government.Finally,a case study of China’s green building enterprise is examined with the simulation.The results show that:the increase of consumer’s green preference payment coefficient and green degree of the building is conducive to the increase of green building price,demand and profit,but the high cost reduces the demand and profit of green building;there is no evolutionary stable strategy under static subsidy and static taxation,while the system exists evolutionary stable strategies under dynamic subsidy and static taxation,dynamic taxation and static subsidy or dynamic subsidy and dynamic taxation;dynamic subsidy and static taxation is better than other policies in promoting green building development;the probability of developers to develop green building is negatively correlated with the upper bound of subsidy,positively correlated with the ceiling of taxation.