融资选择冲突与可变参数风险分担机制

Conflict of financing choice and variable parameter risk sharing mechanism

当中小企业面临资金约束,越来越多的核心企业承担起投资者角色.考虑生产商向资金约束零售商提供贸易信用、供应链金融等内部融资,零售商也可选择互联网金融等外部融资,且所有融资模式均受投资失败风险影响,本文探究生产商最优投资策略.首先建立优化博弈模型依次分析企业融资运营决策;进而分析投资成功率、风险分担率、零售商初始资金等关键参数影响;最后,分析生产商和零售商最优融资模式选择策略及双方博弈均衡策略,以及生产商冲突应对策略.研究表明:贸易信用融资是生产商最优融资提供策略;不同资金量零售商融资模式选择策略不同;当零售商不选择贸易信用融资时,博弈均衡下融资模式可能对生产商不利;本文提出一类可变参数风险分担机制,以改进传统常数风险分担机制的不足:生产商可根据零售商所持资金合理调整风险担保比例,以改变融资均衡.这有助于同时实现生产商、零售商、商业银行三方共赢.本研究为生产商合理开展中小企业投资运营提供了策略支持.

When small and medium-sized enterprises face capital-constrained problem,more and more core enterprises assume the role of investors.Consider a manufacturer to provide financial assistance for a capital-constrained retailer by using trade credit finance and supply chain finance.The retailer can also financing himself by using internet finance.And all of the financing modes are affected by the investment failure risk.This paper explores the optimal investment strategies of the manufacturer.First,the optimization game model is established to analyze the optimal operation decisions of the financing participants.Second,the impacts of key parameters such as the investment success rate,manufacturer's risk guarantee ratio,retailer's initial capital amount are analyzed.Lastly,this paper explores the manufacturer's optimal financing choice strategy,the retailer's optimal financing choice strategy,equilibrium financing mode under the game of both sides,and the manufacturer's optimal conflict coping strategy,respectively.The results show that:Trade credit finance is the optimal financing providing strategy of the manufacturer;Retailers with different capital holdings will choose different financing modes;When the retailer choose not to financing with trade credit finance,the equilibrium financing mode under the game between the manufacturer and the retailer may be detrimental to the manufacturer.This research designs a variable parameter risk sharing mechanism,to improve the insufficient of traditional constant risk sharing mechanism.The manufacturer can change the equilibrium financing mode by adjusting the risk guarantee ratio according to the retailer's initial capital amount,which also can achieve a tripartite win-win situation of the manufacturer,the retailer and the commercial bank.This research provides scientific guidance for manufacturers to conduct investment operations for small and medium-sized enterprises more efficiently.