股权激励下家族企业职业经理人对非效率投资的影响

The Influence of Professional Managers on Inefficient Investment under Equity Incentivein Family Business

投资是维持企业持续经营和发展的基础,一直以来都是学术界研究的热点话题。作为民营企业的重要组成部分,我国家族企业经过40年的发展,目前进入代际传承的关键时刻,同时传统的家族管理模式已经显现出一定的弊端,向现代家族企业职业化转型已是一种必然趋势,选择职业经理人还是家族成员担任CEO对企业的投资行为具有重要的影响。本文以2008-2018年沪深上市家族企业为样本,实证检验家族企业引入职业经理人担任CEO对其非效率投资的影响,以及家族实施股权激励的治理行为对职业经理人和非效率投资之间关系的调节作用。研究结果表明:(1)家族企业选择职业经理人担任CEO,能显著抑制非效率投资,具体来说能减少过度投资,缓解投资不足;(2)股权激励促进了职业经理人对非效率投资的抑制作用。

Investment is the basis of sustainable operation and development of businesses,and has always been a hot topic in academic research.As an important part of private businesses, family businesses in China have entered the critical moment of intergenerational inheritance after 40 years of development.At the same time,the traditional family management has shown some drawbacks.It is an inevitable trend to transform into a modern family business professionalization.Choosing professional managers or family members as CEO has an important impact on the investment behavior of businesses.Based on the sample of family businesses listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2018,this paper empirically examines the impact of professional managers as CEO on inefficient investment in family businesses,as well as the moderating effect of equity incentives on this relationship.The results show that:(1) the choice of professional managers as CEO in family businesses can significantly inhibit inefficient investment,specifically reduce overinvestment and alleviate underinvestment;(2) equity incentives promote the inhibition of professional managers on inefficient investment.