政府干预对国有企业成本粘性的影响研究

Influence of Government Intervention on Cost Stickiness of State-owned Enterprises

将制度环境与国有企业股权特征紧密结合并将其引入企业成本管理研究领域,以2011-2017年沪深A股制造业国有上市公司为研究对象,从第二类代理问题角度考察了政府干预对企业成本粘性的影响,并基于企业实际控制人行政级别差异对上述影响过程进行了深入探讨。研究表明:政府干预通过赋予国有企业政策性负担对企业成本粘性产生显著的强化作用,进一步研究发现,相较于中央国企,政府干预对成本粘性的影响作用在地方国企中更为显著。

This paper combines the institutional environment with the ownership characteristics of state-owned enterprises and relates to the field of enterprise cost management.Taking the state-owned listed manufacturing companies of A-share in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2017 as the research object,this paper examines the impact of government intervention on enterprise cost stickiness from the second kind of agency problem.The influencing process is discussed based on the difference of administrative level of the actual controller.The results show that government intervention has a significantly strengthening effect on cost stickiness by imposing policy burden on state-owned enterprises.In comparison with central state-owned enterprises,further studies show that the impact of government intervention on cost stickiness is more significant on local state-owned enterprises.