摘要
【问题】官员晋升激励对经济发展的影响已得到充分讨论。那么,官员晋升激励是否也会影响政府回应性呢?【方法】基于2018年北京市172.5万余条12345市民来电大数据和28.1万余条政府回访大数据,从回应时长、联系率、解决率和满意率四个维度对基层政府回应市民诉求的模式进行多维测量,进而结合街乡镇和区两级主政官员的晋升履历编码数据,进行多组OLS回归分析。【发现】(1)政府回应性包括程序性回应和实质性回应两种不同的理想类型。(2)主政官员的晋升激励,譬如年龄、特殊工作经历和晋升路径,均对政府回应性产生显著影响。(3)不同层级主政官员晋升激励影响程序性回应和实质性回应性的面向和机理存在差异,街乡镇政府更倾向程序性回应而区政府更倾向实质性回应。【贡献】本文拓展了既有研究对政府回应性的“社会中心论”解释,发现主政官员晋升激励在科层制内部同样为政府回应性提供动力,且形成了“上级政府—基层政府—社会”的特殊性三元作用机制。
Motivation:The impacts of official promotion incentives on economic development are well known.But,will they also affect government responsiveness?Methodology:Based on analyses of more than 1.725 million calls to 12345 from citizens and 281 thousand government recalls in Beijing in 2018,this paper makes a multi-dimensional measurement of the response mode of grassroots government to citizens'demands from four dimensions:response time,contact rate,solution rate and satisfaction rate.Then,combined with the promotion resume coding data of administrative officials at township and district levels,multiple OLS regression analyses are carried out.Findings:(1)There were two ideal types of government responsiveness:procedural responsiveness and substantive responsiveness.(2)The promotion incentives,such as age,special work experience,and promotion path,have significant impacts on government responsiveness.(3)There are differences in the orientation and mechanism of the promotion incentives for the different levels of administrative officials,Which affect procedural responsiveness and substantive responsiveness.The street and township governments prefer procedural responsiveness,while the district governments prefer substantive responsiveness.Contribution:This study expands the existing research on the“social center theory”interpretation of government responsiveness and finds the promotion incentive of the main government officials also provided impetus for the government's responsiveness within the bureaucracy.This forms a triangular mechanism of“superior government,grass-roots,government society”.
作者
赵金旭
孟天广
Jinxu Zhao;Tianguang Meng
出处
《公共行政评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第2期111-134,231,共25页
Journal of Public Administration
基金
2018年度国家社会科学基金重大项目“基于大数据的智能化社会治理监测、评估与应对策略研究”(项目编号:18ZDA110)
国家社科基金重大项目“中国政府职责体系建设研究”(项目编号:17ZDA102)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划青年基金“网络互动视阈下政府社会性监管的回应性研究”(项目编号18YJC810016)。
关键词
主政官员
晋升激励
政府回应性
热线问政
大数据分析
Chief Officials
Promotion Incentive
Government Responsiveness
Government Hot Line
Big Data Analysis