融资约束、非金融企业影子银行活动与宏观审慎政策

Financing Constraint,Shadow Banking Activities of Non-Financial Firms and Macroprudential Policy

本文通过构建反映中国非金融企业影子银行活动特征的DSGE模型,分析非金融企业从事影子银行活动对信贷调控的影响,研判金融监管的经济效应,并在包含影子银行的经济中评估了宏观审慎政策效果。研究发现,非金融企业从事影子银行活动对信贷调控产生漏出效应,削弱了信贷调控效力;政府对影子银行施加金融监管虽然从数量上降低了影子银行规模,但在价格上推升了影子银行贷款利率,并通过降低资产价格收紧信贷抵押约束,在金融加速器作用下融资约束企业向商业银行贷款的数量也会减少,进而加剧其融资难题。逆周期宏观审慎政策通过平滑资产价格变动,不仅改善了金融监管效果,降低了影子银行对经济波动的放大作用,还增进了社会福利。本研究为我国政府部门制定政策监管非金融企业影子银行活动,以及完善宏观审慎监管框架提供了启示。

By constructing a DSGE model that includes shadow banking activities of non-financial companies,the article analyzes the impact of shadow banking on credit regulation and evaluates the effect of macroprudential policy.It finds that shadow banking has a leakage effect on credit regulation.Government’s financial supervision reduces the size of shadow banking,pushing up interest rate on shadow bank loans and decreasing the credit accessible to enterprises.Countercyclical macroprudential policy not only enhances the effect of financial supervision by smoothing asset price fluctuations,but also improves social welfare.