基于序贯博弈的企业研发合作动机研究

Research on the motivation for R&D cooperation between firms based on sequential game

创新是当今时代的重大命题,企业通过持续创新以提升竞争力.与此同时,不断增加的研发费用和研发产出的不确定性促使企业寻求研发合作.本文探究了存在技术溢出下领导企业与追随企业的研发合作动机,重点分析了研发合作对企业竞争力、行业总研发投入和社会福利的影响,并讨论了政府如何在不同的溢出水平下实现社会福利最大化.本文构建了三阶段动态博弈模型:领导企业和追随企业在第一阶段决定是否建立研发合作,在第二阶段同时决定研发水平,在第三阶段进行序贯产量竞争.研究发现:首先,不同于静态博弈的情形,在序贯产量竞争中,只有当溢出水平在较低的范围内时,领导企业和追随企业才会建立研发合作关系;其次,研发合作可能会削弱领导企业的市场势力;最后,市场结果可能是无效的.本文的研究为政府制定相关政策提供了理论依据.

Innovation is a major proposition in today’s era. Firms have to innovate continuously to enhance their competitiveness in the market,but have to seek R&D cooperation due to increasing expenses and output uncertainty in R&D. This paper explores the motivation for R&D cooperation between leader and follower firms with technological spillovers,and highlights the impact of R&D cooperation on firms’ market power,total R&D investment of industry and social welfare.How the government can maximize the social welfare at different spillover levels is also discussed. A three-stage dynamic game model is established,where both the leader and the follower decide whether to establish R&D cooperation in the first stage,choose the R&D level in the second stage,and conduct sequential production competition in the third stage. The following results are derived.First,unlike the result of static games,only when spillover is within a relatively low rangein sequential production competition,will the leader and the follower establish R&D cooperation.Second,the R&D cooperation may reduce the market power of leaders.Third,the market outcomes may be not Paretoefficient. Thus,the research provides a theoretical basis for the government to formulate relevant policies.