不同补贴对象下闭环供应链信息共享价值研究

Research on Information Sharing Value of Closed-loop Supply Chain under Different Subsidy Objects

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级闭环供应链中,为研究政府补贴下供应链需求信息共享对决策的影响及共享价值,针对两种补贴对象,构建并求解无信息共享和信息共享博弈模型,并进行仿真验证.研究表明:1)两种补贴对象下,制造商均能从信息共享中获益,零售商仅在绿色成本和回收成本较低时才会从信息共享中获益;绿色成本和回收成本稍高时,设计基于谈判势力的信息补偿机制能有效促进零售商共享信息.2)产品绿色度和回收率随预测需求量的提高而提高,批发价和零售价仅在回收成本较低时,才会随预测需求量的提高而提高.3)在仅补贴一方情况下,当补贴对象为低补贴一方时,两个主体所获的信息共享价值大;若对两者的补贴均较低,两个主体均希望补贴对象为零售商;若对两者的补贴均较高,零售商不愿共享需求信息.

In the two-level closed-loop supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer,To study the influence of demand information sharing on decision making and the value of information sharing of supply chain under government subsidy,for two kinds of objects,the game models of no information sharing and information sharing are constructed and solved.Research shows that:1)Under the two subsidy objects,manufacturers can benefit from information sharing,while retailers can only benefit from information sharing when the green cost and recovery cost are low;When green cost and recovery cost are high,a coordination mechanism based on negotiation power is designed to facilitate retailers to share information.2)Greenness and recovery rate increase with the improvement of prediction accuracy.The wholesale price and retail price increase with the improvement of prediction accuracy only when the recovery cost is relatively low.3)In the case that the subsidy object is the party with low subsidy,the information Shared by the two subjects is of great value;If the subsidy for both is low,both subjects hope to subsidize the retailer.Retailers are reluctant to share demand information if both subsidies are high.