上市公司薪酬激励与独董监督决策研究

The Study of the Influence of Incentive Mechanism in Remuneration on Independent Directors’ Supervisory Efficiency of Listed Companies

当前中国上市公司独立董事收入主要为固定薪酬,有效薪酬激励欠缺必将影响独立董事监督效果。能否建立有效的独立董事薪酬激励,令其发挥监督职能,直接关系到公司治理的成败。文章构建了不同薪酬激励下独立董事监督和大股东掏空决策的演化博弈模型,运用演化博弈方法分析了不同薪酬激励下独立董事和大股东的策略选择过程,论证了薪酬激励对独立董事监督职能发挥的影响。研究结果表明:在将独立董事薪酬分为固定薪酬和可变薪酬的基础上,当给予独立董事固定薪酬,固定薪酬的大小对于独立董事在董事会上提出异议履行监督职能不会产生影响,而如果能够给予独立董事随中小股东等外部投资者的收益升降而增减的变动薪酬,则会激励其有效履行监督职能等行为带来正向的影响。

Up to now,the income of independent directors in China’s listed companies is mainly fixed salary.The lack of effective remunerated mechanism will affect the effect of independent directors’supervision.How to establish effective remunerated mechanism for independent directors and make them play the supervisory function is directly related to the success of corporate governance.This paper constructs evolutionary game model of independent director who is in different salary incentive have an different supervise decision making and the major shareholders are hollowed the enterprise or serve for the interests of the enterprise.with the perspective of evolutionary game,the paper analyse the independent director’s selected process under different salary incentive strategy and the independent director’s effect to the strong stock holders,we demonstrates that the different salary how to effect the independent directors’decision making.The results show that it is must that dividing the remuneration of independent directors into fixed remuneration and variable remuneration.When the independent directors is given the fixed salary,it won’t impact performance of the supervise decision making of independent directors.And if we can make the variable remuneration as the incentive mechanism and its promotion and demotion is depend on the external investors’returns,the incentive mechanism will bring positive influence when independent directors perform their supervisory functions.