上市公司信息披露政府监管演化路径研究

The Evolution Route of Government Supervisionover Information Disclosure of Listed Companies

借助演化经济学方法,通过建立演化博弈模型,构建了上市公司信息披露与政府监管机构监管行为的支付矩阵,分析了上市公司的信息披露行为和政府监管机构监管行为的演化过程特征及均衡状态。通过数值仿真演示不同参数变化对系统演化结果的影响。研究发现,上市公司信息披露和政府监管路径演化系统收敛于"理想"状态与"不良锁定"状态两种模式,通过调节参数可以优化上市公司信息披露和政府监管机构监管路径演化,并提出了避免陷入"不良锁定",引导上市公司群体和政府监管群体朝着理想状态(提供真实的信息,监管)演进的建议。

Based on the evolutionary principle of information disclosure of listed companies and the supervisory behavior of government regulatory departments,an evolutionary game model is established using evolutionary economics.This paper constructs the payment matrix of the information disclosure of listed companies and the supervisory behavior of government regulatory departments,and analyzes the process characteristics and equilibrium state of the evolution.The effect of different parameters on the evolution of the system is demonstrated by numerical simulation with Matlab software.It is found that the evolution system converges in two patterns:"ideal"status and"bad lock"status.Through adjusting the parameters,we can optimize the evolution route.The paper also puts forward some suggestions on how to avoid falling into"bad lock"and guide the group of listed companies and the group of government regulatory departments to the ideal status(providing true information,supervision).