金字塔结构与股价崩盘风险——基于治理机制的探索

Pyramid Structure and the Risk of Stock Price Crash:Exploration based on Governance Mechanism

文章以沪深两市2010—2018年的上市公司为样本,实证检验了企业终极控制人金字塔结构与股价崩盘风险之间的关系,并探讨了两者关系的中介效应和调节效应。研究结果发现:当企业存在金字塔结构时,股价崩盘风险会降低,且随着金字塔结构复杂性的增加股价崩盘风险会进一步降低。此外,内部治理水平的完善也会降低企业股价崩盘风险。基于内部治理水平的传导机制显示,企业内部治理水平与终极控制人金字塔结构具有互补效应,都能有效降低企业股价崩盘风险。中介效应的进一步分析发现,企业存在金字塔结构通过降低第一类代理成本和第二类代理成本进而降低股价崩盘风险,且金字塔结构与股价崩盘风险的负向关系在经济政策不确定性更强和国有企业样本中更加显著。

Taking listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2010 to 2018 as samples,this paper empirically tests the relationship between the pyramid structure of ultimate controller and the risk of stock price collapse,and explores the mediating effect and moderating effect of the relationship.The results show that:When there is a pyramid structure,the risk of stock price collapse will be reduced,and with the increase of the complexity of the pyramid structure,the risk of stock price crash will be further reduced.In addition,the improvement of internal governance level will also reduce the risk of stock price crash.The transmission mechanism based on the level of internal governance shows that the internal governance level and the ultimate controller pyramid structure have complementary effects,which can effectively reduce the risk of stock price crash.Further analysis of the mediating effect shows that there is a pyramid structure in enterprises,which can reduce the risk of stock price collapse by reducing the first and second types of agency costs,and the negative relationship between pyramid structure and stock price collapse risk is more significant in the economic policy uncertainty and state-owned enterprise samples.