金融错配影响企业创新模式选择的演化博弈分析

The Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Influence of Financial Resource Mismatch on Enterprise Innovation Mode Selection

该文首先基于演化博弈理论构建金融错配影响企业创新模式选择的收益矩阵,然后基于演化博弈的复制演化动态方程求解博弈稳定均衡解,最后进行数值模拟仿真.研究结果表明:企业选择原始发明创新与2次创新的演化策略存在(0,0)、(0,1)、(1,0)和(1,1)4个均衡点;当金融错配程度及企业研发成功概率分别处于一方恒定而另一方变化状态时,2类企业选择原始发明创新的概率随时间变化分别呈现出线性或非线性递增、递减及无序化等多样性特征.

Based on evolutionary game theory,the payoff matrix of financial mismatch affecting the choice of enterprise innovation mode is firstly constructed,and then the stable equilibrium solution of the game based on the replication evolution dynamic equation of evolutionary game is solved.Finally,a numerical simulation is carried out.It is found that there are(0,0),(0,1),(1,0)and(1,0)evolutionary strategies for enterprises to choose original invention innovation and secondary innovation.When the degree of financial mismatch and the probability of R&D success of enterprises are in the state of one constant and the other changing,the probability of two types of enterprises choosing original invention and innovation shows the characteristics of linear or nonlinear increasing,decreasing and disorder with time.