摘要
针对制造商主导下的闭环供应链,建立具有风险规避特征零售商的3种双回收渠道模型,运用Stackelberg博弈理论进行建模分析,并利用数值算例对相关结论进行验证和深入分析。研究发现:①零售商的风险规避行为会导致自身期望效用的损失,但可提高制造商的期望效用,同时对第三方期望效用的影响趋势不同;②不管零售商风险规避程度如何变化,制造商与零售商的期望效用和逆向渠道回收率,均在制造商与零售商双回收模型中取得最大值;③当零售商具有较强的风险规避态度时,制造商和第三方双回收模型的逆向渠道回收率最高;④零售商的风险规避行为对最优废旧产品转移价格有很大影响。
The present study develops three dual-recycling channel models based on considering retailer’s risk aversion in dual-recycling channel closed-loop supply chains(CLSCs)which are led by manufacturers.The Stackelberg game theory is employed and a numerical experiment is conducted to verify the conclusions and for further discussion.The results are proposed as follows:①The manufacturer can benefit from the retailer’s risk aversion behavior,while the retailer will endure some expected utilities loss.Besides,the retailer’s risk aversion will exert greatly different impacts on the third-party’s optimal expected utilities under different models.②Regardless of the retailer’s risk aversion degree,both manufacturer and retailer can capture the largest expected utilities and return rates when both of them carry on recycling activities.③The collection rate is the highest with manufacturer-third-party dual-recycling channel model when the retailer has strong risk aversion attitude.④The optimal buyback price is greatly affected by the retailer’s risk aversion.
作者
张玉豪
张涛
ZHANG Yuhao;ZHANG Tao(Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai,China;Shanghai Key Laboratory of Financial Information Technology,Shanghai,China)
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第4期587-596,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(19YJA630116)
上海市自然科学基金资助项目(19ZR1417200)
上海市科学技术委员会“科技创新行动计划”资助项目(20511101403)。