经济周期波动下CEO内部债务激励和企业风险承担研究

CEO Inside Debt Incentive and Risk-Taking under Business Cyclical Fluctuation

考虑宏观经济周期不确定下,CEO内部债务激励与风险承担问题。假定管理者持有内部债务激励——减记型或有可转换债券,分析这一新型薪酬激励对管理层冒险动机、公司代理成本的影响。应用随机控制和动态规划原理,得到银行证券价值和管理者薪酬闭式解。研究表明:内部债务激励较传统薪酬在抑制管理者冒险动机、降低委托代理成本方面均具有明显优势,尤其在经济衰退时期,合理调整CEO内部债务持有比重可完全消除管理者冒险动机,使管理者更加谨慎、注重银行长远利益。

In this study,we consider the uncertainty of the macroeconomic cycle,the inside debt incentive and risk taking of CEO.Assuming that managers hold inside debt incentive,write-down contingent convertible bonds,this study analyzes the impact of this new compensation incentive on the risk taking motivation of the management and agency cost of the company.In this study,the closed-form solutions of bank securities value and managers’compensation are obtained by applying the principles of stochastic control and dynamic programming.The analysis shows that inside debt incentive has obvious advantages over traditional compensation in restraining managers’risk-taking motivation and reducing principal-agent costs.Especially in the economic recession,reasonable adjustment of the proportion of CEO’s inside debt holdings can completely eliminate managers’risk-taking motivation and make managers more cautious and pay attention to the long-term interests of Banks.