上下游企业绿色创新的稳定性分析——基于演化博弈的视角

Stability analysis of upstream and downstream enterprises? green innovation——Based on the perspective of evolutionary games

通过建立供应链上下游企业中的供应商和制造商的双方博弈模型,考虑创新成本、创新补偿及创新收益增量等不同参数对双方企业绿色创新策略选择的影响。数值分析表明:强有力的成本控制对于企业绿色创新有着显著的正向影响;高水平的创新补贴能够积极促进企业进行创新;通过"搭便车"策略获得增量收益不足以弥补成本时,会反推企业进行绿色创新。

By establishing a game model between suppliers and manufacturers in the upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain, the impact of different parameters such as innovation cost, innovation compensation, and innovation income increase on the choice of green innovation strategies of the two companies is considered. Numerical analysis shows that: strong cost control has a significant positive impact on corporate green innovation;high levels of innovation subsidies can actively promote innovation;when incremental profits are not enough to cover costs through the "free-rider" strategy, promote enterprises for green innovation.