股权激励、行权业绩考核与股价崩盘风险

Equity Incentive,Performance-vesting Provisions and Stock Price Crash Risk

中国证监会强制要求上市公司在实施董事和高级管理人员(统称高管)股权激励计划时设置行权业绩考核指标和对应条件。本文利用2006—2016年A股上市公司实施高管股权激励计划的详细数据,考察高管股权激励是否会影响公司未来股价崩盘风险,并进一步探讨行权业绩考核目标完成难度所发挥的作用。实证结果表明,中国A股上市公司实施的高管股权激励计划与公司未来股价崩盘风险显著正相关,并且高管股权激励计划设置的行权业绩考核目标越难完成,公司未来股价崩盘风险越高。在使用倾向得分匹配(PSM)、工具变量两阶段最小二乘回归(2 SLS)以及倾向得分匹配加双重差分(PSM+DID)控制遗漏变量和逆向因果导致的内生性问题后,上述结论依旧成立。以上结果说明高管股权激励及其行权业绩考核激发了公司管理层隐匿利空消息的机会主义行为。

Executive equity incentive plans in China are required to be performancebased.This paper studies whether executive equity incentive plan and its performance-vesting provisions will promote stock price crash risk using the detailed data of Chinese listed companies’equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2016.We find that the executive equity incentive plan implemented by listed companies in China is positively correlated with the stock price crash risk,and the more difficult vesting targets of equity incentive plan is,the higher the stock price crash risk is.After controlling for endogenous problems(PSM,two-stage least square method,PSM plus DID)and use alternative proxy variables for stock price crash risk,the above conclusions are still robust.Our evidence suggests that executive equity incentive plan and its performance-vesting provisions motivate executives to hide bad news.