高管薪酬信息披露的经济后果研究

Research on Economic Consequences of Information disclosure of executive compensation

高管薪酬信息披露有助于提升公司薪酬契约透明度及治理效率,但同时增加了公司的信息披露成本。因此,高管薪酬信息披露对于公司的经济后果研究是一个值得探讨的话题。通过高管薪酬信息披露对薪酬水平、薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,观测我国高管薪酬信息披露的后果,并进一步观测不同产权性质公司间的影响差异。结果表明:信息披露政策抑制了高管薪酬水平,加强了薪酬业绩敏感性,相比于国有企业,非国有企业的高管薪酬信息披露政策效果更显著。

The information disclosure of executive compensation helps to improve the transparency of compensation contract and governance efficiency in company,but it also increases information disclosure costs of company.Therefore,the economic consequences of information disclosure of executive compensation to the companies is a topic worth exploring.The article observes the consequences of information disclosure of executive compensation in China by studying the impact of information disclosure of executive compensation on compensation levels and Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS),and furthermore,it observes the differences of the effects between companies of various property right The results show that the information disclosure policy restrains the level of executive compensation and strengthens the Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS).Compared with state-owned enterprises,information disclosure policy for executive compensation of non-state-owned enterprises is more effective.