Nash讨价还价公平关切下基于低碳商誉的供应链联合减排与广告的动态优化与协调

Dynamic Optimization and Coordination on Joint Carbon Emission Reduction and Advertising in a Supply Chain of Low-Carbon Goodwill Considering Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns

基于Nash讨价还价理论构建公平效用体系,同时考虑产品低碳水平和低碳商誉具有动态变化特征,运用微分博弈理论与方法探讨了供应链成员的公平关切行为对分散决策下零售商广告策略和制造商减排策略的影响以及集中决策下的相关策略。通过对比发现,集中决策下产品的低碳水平更高,在此基础上,提出了双向成本分担契约,实现了供应链协调。最后通过数值仿真,对重要参数进行了敏感性分析,并验证了契约的有效性。研究发现:当制造商边际利润比较小时,制造商不会对减排进行投入;只有当满足一定条件时,制造商才会承担零售商的广告成本;制造商的公平关切行为不利于企业发展低碳经济;零售商适当地关注公平,有利于企业发展低碳经济;与分散决策相比,双向成本分担契约下制造商和零售商的效用以及利润现值均有所提升。

Under the tremendous pressure of global climate issue,developing low-carbon economy based on low energy consumption,low emission and low pollution has gradually become a core strategy for the world to cope with climate change.The low-carbon economy mode has a great influence on supply chain’s competition regulations,cost composition and ways of operation.Therefore,it is necessary to explore the theory and practice of low-carbon supply chain.Through literature review,most literature ignore the dynamic characteristics of the low-carbon level and low-carbon goodwill of the product.In addition,there is little literature of low-carbon supply chain optimization and coordination considering decision makers’Nash bargaining fairness concerned behavior.In this paper,a utility system about fairness concerns is developed based on the Nash bargaining theory,and the dynamic characteristics of low-carbon level and low-carbon goodwill are taken into consideration.The effect of each member’s fairness concerns on the retailer’s low-carbon advertising strategy and the manufacturer’s emission reduction strategy are explored utilizing the differential games theory and method.Through the contrastive analysis,it is discovered that the low-carbon level is higher in the centralized decision-making mode.On this basis,a two-way cost-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain.Finally,based on the parameter values chosen from the previous literature(e.g.Du et al.,2015[2];Andre et al.,2011[17]),the validity of the contract is verified and the sensitivity analysis of key parameters is also presented by a numerical example.It is shown that if the manufacturer’s marginal profit rate in the total supply chain is low,the manufacturer will not invest in emission reduction.The manufacturer is willing to undertake part of the advertising cost if the parameters satisfy certain conditions.The manufacturer’s fairness concerns have negative effect on the development of low carbon economy for the enterprises in the supply chain.Appropriate attention of the retailer to the fairness can increase revenues of its own and the whole supply chain system.Compared with the decentralized decision-making mode,the utility and the profit of each member in the supply chain under the two-way cost-sharing contract are all improved.In this study,the scope and content of the low-carbon supply chain optimization and coordination problem under the consideration of decision makers’behavior are enriched,and the guidance for the related application of the differential games is provided.