难以确定的“确定性”——析维特根斯坦哲学生涯的一个内在悖论

“Certainty” that is Hard to be Certain:an Inner Paradox in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Career

认知维度上的确定性是西方哲学的一个重要问题,也是维特根斯坦哲学生涯中始终关注的焦点之一。他在前期《逻辑哲学论》里把确定性归结为"逻辑必然性",在后期《哲学研究》里却凭借"家族相似"的理念彰显不确定性,在晚年的《论确定性》里又试图从"生活形式"以及实践行为中寻找确定性的根基,相关见解经历了复杂曲折而颇有意义的演变发展,但最终还是没能走出这座理论迷宫。只有将确定性与人们的认知需要和非认知需要关联起来,我们才能结合现实生活的价值内容,揭开这道难题的谜底。

Certainty in the cognitive dimension is an important issue of Western philosophy,and it is also one of the focuses of Wittgenstein in his philosophical career. In his early book Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,he mainly attributes certainty to"logical necessity". In his later book Philosophical Investigations,he tends to affirm uncertainty by virtue of the idea of"family resemblance". In his last book On Certainty,he tries to find the foundation of certainty from the "form of life"and daily practices.Therefore,his views on this issue have experienced some complicated and significant development,reflecting the profound influence of "cognitive-rational"spirit on him. Only by connecting certainty with people’s cognitive needs and non-cognitive needs can we find the right way to solve this problem by putting it into the context of the value content of real life.