分析师关注、控股股东股权质押与关联并购绩效

Analyst's Attention,Controlling Shareholder's Equity Pledge and Related M&A Performance

本文以2007-2016年我国沪、深两市A股上市公司作为并购方发生的关联并购事件为样本,应用多元回归的方法研究了分析师关注、控股股东股权质押对公司关联并购绩效的影响。实证结果表明:控股股东股权质押对公司关联并购绩效有显著的负向影响,并且随着控股股东股权质押比例的提高,这种负向影响会逐渐增强。此外,证券分析师作为重要的市场参与主体,在公司关联并购中发挥着外部治理作用,表现为分析师的关注对控股股东股权质押与公司关联并购绩效之间的负向关系有抑制作用。

This paper studies the impact of analysts’ attention and controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on the performance of affiliated merger and acquisition(MA) based on the samples of related merger and acquisition events of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2016. The empirical results show that: the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge has a significant negative impact on the company’s affiliated merger and acquisition performance, and with the increase of the proportion of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge, this negative impact will gradually increase. In addition, as an important market participant, securities analysts play an external governance role in the company’s related merger and acquisition, which shows that the analysts’ attention has a negative effect on the negative relationship between the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and the performance of the company’s related merger and acquisition.