基于交通违法行为的外卖分级配送政府补贴机制研究

Research on Government Subsidy Mechanism of Food Delivery Based on Tripartite Game

【目的】为减少外卖配送员的交通违法行为,构建和谐有序的城市交通环境,探讨外卖分级配送政府补贴机制可行性。【方法】借助问卷调查法对西安市外卖配送情况进行调研,利用多方博弈理论,构建政府、外卖配送企业和消费者的三方参与的博弈模型,通过参数分析和数值仿真模拟,验证提出的外卖分级配送政府补贴机制对于缓解外卖配送交通违法的可行性。【结果】实行外卖分级配送政府补贴能够提高社会福利,减少外卖配送员的交通违法行为,但政府的最优化策略与外卖配送产品的质量差异有关,质量差异大时,政府可不进行干预,充分发挥外卖市场的灵活性;质量差异较小时,政府要采取较高的补贴率才能达到社会福利最大化的目标。【结论】以外卖配送的交通安全问题为研究重点,分析该问题产生的内因,提出外卖配送领域的分级配送机制,并借鉴经典的三方博弈模型分析该机制可行性和均衡结果,将博弈理论引入了外卖配送研究领域。

[Purposes]In order to reduce the traffic violations of food delivery staff,build a harmonious and orderly urban traffic environment,and explore the feasibility of a government subsidy mechanism for tiered food delivery.[Methods]With the help of questionnaire survey method,the situation of food delivery in Xi’an was investigated,and the tripartite game theory was used to construct a game model involving the government,food delivery companies and consumers.Through parameter analysis and numerical simulation,the proposed government subsidies for tiered delivery of food delivery.The feasibility of the mechanism is used to alleviate the illegal traffic of food delivery.[Findings]Government subsidies can improve social welfare and reduce the traffic violations of food delivery staff.However,the government’s optimization strategy is related to the quality difference of delivery products.When the quality difference is large,the government can’t intervene and give full play to the flexibility of the food delivery market;if the quality difference is small,the government should adopt a higher subsidy rate to achieve the goal of maximizing social welfare.[Conclusions]It’s the first time that the traffic safety issue of food delivery is the focus of research.The internal causes are analyzed,the graded delivery mechanism in the field of food delivery is proposed,and the feasibility and equilibrium results of the classic tripartite game model are analyzed for reference.The field has a certain degree of innovation.