不完全信息下国际工程项目业主与承包商之间索赔的博弈分析

The Game Analysis of claims between Owners and Contractors of International Engineering Project Under Incomplete Information

目前,中国处于新常态经济发展的重要阶段,我国从20世纪80年代开始开拓对外项目,众多建筑企业纷纷走出国门参与到国际工程的建设中去,然而,国际工程项目建设周期长、利益关系复杂、风险因素多等特征使得工程索赔问题也进一步的突显出来,我国理论界和实业界关于国际工程项目的索赔问题都进行了一定的研究,但是基于承包商角度对业主与承包商的索赔问题的研究甚少,本文以国际工项目程中业主与承包商为研究对象,构建了一个不完全信息静态博弈模型,通过逆向归纳法解得到不同情况下的纳什均衡,说明索赔对于合同双方,尤其是承包商的重要性,希望对以后相关研究有所贡献。

At present,China is in an important stage of the new normal economic development.Since the 1980s,China began to develop foreign projects,and many construction enterprises have gone abroad to participate in the construction of international projects.However,the long construction cycle,complex interest relations,and many risk factors of international projects further highlight the problem of project claims,which is also the focus of China’s construction industry.There are some researches on the claim problem of international engineering projects in both academic and industrial circles,but there are few researches on the claim problem of owners and contractors from the perspective of contractors.Taking the owners and contractors in international engineering projects as the research object,a static game model with incomplete information is constructed in this paper,the Nash equilibrium under different conditions is obtained through reverse induction to explain the importance of claim for both parties of the contract,especially the contractor,hoping to contribute to the related research in the future.