考虑消费者风险偏好和随机底价的“消费者出价”营销模式

Name-your-own-price mode with random threshold considering consumer’s risk preferences

考虑消费者风险偏好特征,提出一种新型随机底价的“消费者出价”营销模式(random-name-your-own-price,RN).在消费者估值异质假设下,运用数学建模、参数分析和数值模拟的方法,讨论单一垄断和同质化竞争两种情形下零售商的策略选择问题.结果表明,单一垄断情形下,消费者对出价失败风险的厌恶会促使其在RN模式下出价更高,进而扩大零售商利润;而在同质化竞争情形下,无论消费者是否具有风险厌恶性质,都会有零售商愿意采用RN模式,且“一方采用单一固定价格模式(posted-price,PP),另一方采用RN模式”始终是两家零售商的纳什均衡策略.

This paper proposes a new name-your-own-price mode called“RN mode”considering consumers’risk preferences,which has a random threshold.Under the assumption of heterogeneous valuation of consumers,the methods of mathematical modeling,parameter analysis and numerical simulation are conducted to discuss the retailer’s strategy selection in the case of single monopoly and homogeneous competition respectively.The results indicate that,in the single monopoly case,consumers’risk aversion will make them bid higher under RN mode,which is also better for the retailer.In the case of homogeneous competition,whether consumers are risk-averse or not,the retailer is willing to adopt the RN mode;and under both circumstances,that“one adopts the PP mode while the other adopts the RN mode”is always the Nash equilibrium strategy.