从司法克制到积极干预:有限公司股利强制分配的理论与实践

From Judicial Restraint to Positive Intervention: The Theories and Practices of Compulsory Profit Distribution in Closely Held Corporations

在有限公司中,法院得在多大程度、以何种方式介入公司股利分配事项,对(少数)股东的权益保障意义重大。相较于股份(公开)公司,股利分配往往成为有限公司的少数股东获取资产收益的唯一途径;控股股东对少数股东的压迫行为,也经常围绕不予分配或者仅分配少量股利展开。有鉴于此,《公司法司法解释四》第15条允许在滥用股东权利之情形出现时,由法院强制判决公司分配股利。然而,其实际司法运作却呈现出对滥用股东权利之内涵进行不当限缩的问题。虽然这种限缩可以从股利无关论、商业判断规则和避免计算难题中得到解释;然而这些解释或者缺乏足够的法理支撑,或者未能顾及有限公司的特殊语境,由此,将会产生对少数股东救济不足的问题。未来的司法实践应当采用更为积极的干预态度,不仅重视回归保护合理预期内滥用股东权利的内涵,引入中间审查标准,借助现金流贴现模型和专家证言,更要采取措施避免滥诉,并提升纠纷解决的终局性。

whether and to what extent would the court intervene into the matter of corporate profit distribution is of vital importance in closely held corporations. Compared to publicly held corporations, profit distribution is often the only way for minority shareholders to get their capital return. Refusing to declare dividend or only declaring small amount of dividend is an ordinary means for controlling shareholders to oppress minority ones. Taking it into consideration, the fifth judicial interpretation of Chinese Corporate Law allows courts to make judgment forcing the accused corporations to distribute certain amount of profit. However, in real judicial practice, majority courts tend to narrow the definition of abusive use of shareholder’s right. Although, that kind of practice cloud be explained through dividend irrelevance theory, business judgment rule and computing puzzle, these explanations could hardly be justified in the context of closely held corporations. The future judicial practice should be more positive. Not only the definition of abusive use of shareholder’s right should be based on reasonable expectation standard, the intermediate scrutiny standard, discounted cash flow model and expert testimony be brought in, measures should be taken to prevent strike suits and promote the finality of dispute resolving.