土地托管、市场锁定与合约选择——基于四川省成都市两个合作社的比较制度分析

Trusteeship of Land,Market Locking-in and Contract Selection——A Comparative Institutional Analysis about Two Cooperatives from Chengdu,Sichuan Province

为深刻理解合约选择过程,在调研所得案例基础上,构建理论模型对土地托管制的合约性质做出了理论判断。案例分析从风险分担与激励效应两个维度刻画了不同合约形式(固定租金合约、固定工资合约、分成合约)被选择的经济逻辑。实地观察表明,两个合作社的成功均在于对终端市场的锁定,在分析中,锁定的经济诱因、影响因素和经济学含义以及土地托管制与锁定终端市场的内在联系均得到了逻辑一致的解释。比较研究发现,两个合作社在合约稳定性和扩展性方面存在显著差异,这导致二者将潜在盈利转化为现实利益的能力有所不同。

In order to deeply understand the contract selection process,based on the case studies obtained,a theoretical model is constructed to make a theoretical judgment on the contractual nature of the trusteeship of land.From the two dimensions of risk sharing and incentive effect,the case study describes the economic logic of different contract forms(fixed rent contract fixed wage contralt,and sharecropping contract).Field observations indicate that the success of both cooperatives lies in the locking of the terminal market.So in the analysis,the economic reasons,the influencing factors and the economic meanings of locking,as well as the internal relationship between the trusteeship of land and the locking of market,have been logically explained.The comparative study shows that there are significant differences in contract stability and contract expandability between the two cooperatives,which leads to differences in their ability to convert potential profits into real benefits.