论强人工智能体刑事责任主体之否定

Negation of Criminal Responsibility Subject of Strong Artificial Intelligence Agent

人工智能不同于人工智能体。从功利主义角度看,人工智能体的行为是先行程序设定的继续推导,其不具有辨认和控制能力,因而不具备自由意志。同时强人工智能体缺乏法规范遵从能力的意志,对其无法进行刑事苛责和施加刑罚,因此不能作为刑事责任主体;从人本主义视角看,强人工智能体同法人在意志能力、财产权利和刑罚配备上均有很大区别,因此无法类比法人将强人工智能体拟制为刑事主体。理应将人工智能体看作人类社会治理的辅助工具,从而有效规制人工智能体带来的刑事风险,解决人工智能犯罪的刑事归责问题。

Artificial intelligence is different from artificial intelligence agent.From the perspective of utilitarianism,the behavior of artificial intelligence agent is the continuation of the previous program setting,with no recognition or control,and therefore no free will.At the same time,the strong artificial intelligence agent body lacks the will to comply with the legal norms,thus can not be convicted and criminally punished.So it can not be regarded as the subject of criminal responsibility.From the humanistic point of view,the strong artificial intelligence agent is quite different from the legal person in the aspects of will power,property right and penalty equipment,so it can’t be modeled as the criminal subject by analogy with the legal person.Artificial intelligence agent should be regarded as an auxiliary tool of human social governance,so as to effectively regulate the criminal risk brought by artificial intelligence and solve the problem of criminal liability of artificial intelligence crime.