“惩一”必然“儆百”吗?——监管处罚间接威慑失效研究

Punish One, Teach a Hundred? A Study on the Failure of the Indirect Deterrence Effects of Regulatory Punishments

上市公司监管在提升上市公司质量、改善资本市场资源配置效率方面发挥着重要作用,本文基于高管联结的情景考察监管处罚间接威慑的有效性及其实现机理。研究发现,监管处罚发生后,违规公司财务错报明显减少,而其违规高管联结的未违规公司财务错报反而明显增加。深入研究发现,监管处罚发生后,违规高管更可能从未违规公司离职;但同时,积极发表否定意见的独立董事也主动从未违规公司离职,审计师对于未违规公司中高企的执业风险未有效调整审计决策。由此,上述公司治理的负面变化超过了正面调整,最终导致监管处罚间接威慑失效。最后,监管处罚间接威慑失效导致这些未违规公司的公司价值受到减损。综上表明,监管处罚要实现"惩一儆百"的治理效果,有赖于上市公司内外部治理机制的协调配合。这对于监管层完善上市公司监管制度以提升上市公司质量、深化资本市场改革具有重要启示。

The supervision of listed firms plays an important role in improving the quality of listed firms and the efficiency of resource allocation in the capital market.We study the effectiveness and realization mechanisms of the indirect deterrence effects of regulatory punishments from the perspective of executives’ interlock.We find that the financial misstatement decreases for punished firms while increases for innocent firms which interlock with punished ones through punished executives after regulatory punishments.Further analyses indicate that punished executives are more likely to leave these innocent firms after being punished.But independent directors actively saying"no"are more likely to resign from these innocent firms and auditors do not make adjustment to audit decisions for the rising engagement risk.Therefore, the aforementioned negative adjustments exceeding positive adjustments of corporate governance results in the failure of the indirect deterrence effects of regulatory punishments, finally leading to these innocent firms’ value being impaired.Our findings indicate that the indirect deterrence effects of regulatory punishments depend on the coordination with internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.And our findings also have important enlightenment to the regulator on perfecting the listed firms’ supervisory system to deepen the reform of the capital market and improve the quality of listed firms.