财务舞弊、供应链集中度与企业商业信用融资

Financial Fraud, Supply Chain Concentration, and Corporate Trade Credit Financing

企业商业信用是一种重要的非正式融资渠道,以我国证券市场2007至2019年A股上市公司为研究对象,本文系统地检验了财务舞弊如何作用于企业商业信用融资行为,并分别检验了客户(买方)与供应商(卖方)集中度对企业财务舞弊与商业信用融资之间关系的影响。实证研究发现:(1)被查处存在财务舞弊的企业,其商业信用融资额下降的可能性更大,并且这一监管处罚行为对企业商业信用融资变化额带来一定的负面影响;(2)上述理论关系只在客户(买方)集中度较高或供应商(卖方)集中度较高的情形下存在;(3)内部控制以及分析师关注是缓解企业财务舞弊与商业信用融资之间负相关关系的重要机制。上述研究结果表明,财务舞弊披露的信号机制能够促使供应商与客户合理地判断舞弊企业的信用风险,从而适时地减少商业信用供给以缓解各自的营运风险,但这一经济决策受到企业公司治理机制的影响。本研究丰富和拓展了企业财务舞弊经济后果与商业信用融资的影响机制研究,为供应链参与企业"共同治理"提供了崭新的经验证据。

Corporate trade credit is an important informal financing channel.Using China’s A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2019 as the research sample, this paper examines how financial fraud affects corporate trade credit financing, and further tests how the customer concentration or the supplier concentration moderates the relationship between financial fraud and corporate trade credit.The results show that:(1)fraud-firms are more likely to have a decline in their corporate trade credit financing, and this regulatory penalty also has a certain negative impact on the change of trade credit financing;(2)the above-mentioned theoretical relationship exists only in cases where the customer(buyer)concentration or the supplier(seller)concentration is higher;(3)corporate internal control and analysts’ attention are two important mechanisms to alleviate the negative correlation between financial fraud and corporate trade credit.These results suggest that the signal mechanism of financial fraud disclosure can encourage suppliers and customers to judge the credit risk of fraud-firms reasonably and then reduce the supply of trade credit in time to mitigate their respective operating risks, but this economic decision is influenced by corporate governance mechanisms.This study enriches and expands the literature of the economic consequences of financial fraud and the influencing mechanisms of trade credit financing, and provides new empirical evidence for supply chain participants in"co-governance".