政府审计独立性提升的治理效应——以审计机关人财物改革对公务接待行为的影响为例

Governance Effect of Improving the Independence of Government Auditing: The Impact of the Human Resources, Finance and Material Management Reform of Audit Institutions on Official Reception Behavior

为保障审计机关依法独立行使审计监督权,我国实行了省以下审计机关人财物管理改革试点。本文利用该改革试点为准自然实验,从政府公务接待行为视角,运用双重差分法分析政府审计独立性提升所带来的治理效应。研究发现,审计机关人财物管理改革能够有效降低地方政府公务接待费用。进一步分析发现:(1)改革的治理效应主要体现在抑制超额公务接待费用方面;(2)改革强度越高,对公务接待费用的抑制能力越强;(3)审计监督力度得到提升是改革发挥上述治理效应的可能作用机制;(4)在省级审计机关关注程度高、腐败程度高、市场化及法制化程度低的地区,改革对地方政府公务接待行为的治理效应更强。

In order to ensure audit institutions independently exercise their audit supervision powers, our country has implemented pilot reform in the human, financial, and material management of audit institutions below the province.We use this reform pilot as a"quasi-natural experiment",and use the difference-in-difference method to analyze the governance effect from the perspective of government official reception behavior.We find that the reform can effectively reduce the official reception fees of local governments.Further research shows that the governance effect of the reform is mainly reflected in the suppression of excessive official reception fees.And the higher intensity of the reform, the stronger ability to restrain official reception fees.In addition, the significant increase in the intensity of audit supervision is a possible mechanism for the reform to exert the governance effect.In heterogeneity, we find the governance effect is more pronounced in the cities with higher audit attention from senior governments, higher levels of corruption, and poorer market and legal environment.