摘要
产教融合平台参与主体的相互博弈影响了平台的稳健运行.产研机构与高校之间的博弈存在"维持合作"与"中途退出"两种策略;论证了设置较高的"中途退出"违约成本、降低交易成本和增加预期收益有助于平台参与主体选择"维持合作"策略,进而提高平台的稳定性.就参与主体与产教融合平台的合作稳定性而言,发现稳定演化策略需要结合不同的情形进行分别讨论;但无论哪种情形,均能证实在同等创新资源投入成本情形下,预期收益与交易成本之差成为策略选择的关键所在.最后提出四点平台稳定性的治理对策.
This article expounds the connotation of the stability of the production-education integrated platform,and points out that the mutual game of the platform participants affects the stable operation of the platform.A game has been formed between the production-research institution and the university,and there are two strategies of"maintaining cooperation"and"halving out".Demonstrates that setting a higher"halfway exit"default cost,reducing transaction costs,and increasing expected returns can help platform participants choose the"maintain cooperation"strategy,thereby improving the stability of the platform.In terms of the stability of the cooperation between the participating subjects and the production-education integration platform,it is found that the specific stable evolution strategy needs to be discussed separately in different situations.But in either case,it can be confirmed that under the same input cost of innovative resources,the difference between expected revenue and transaction cost becomes the key to strategic choice.Finally,the paper puts forward the Countermeasures for the stability of the platform.
作者
李玉倩
LI Yu-qian(Jiangsu Modern Information Society Research Base,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210023,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
2021年第7期71-81,共11页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家社会科学基金“基于开放式创新的智慧城市隐私风险生态治理研究”(19BGL279)
江苏现代信息社会研究基地资助项目。
关键词
交易成本
产教融合
稳定性
演化博弈
transaction cost
production-education integration
stability
evolutionary game