考虑成员风险态度的零售商资金约束闭环供应链定价与回收决策

Pricing and Recycling Decisions of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Participators’ Risk Attitudes and Retailer Capital Constraint

针对由制造商、回收商和资金约束的零售商组成的三级闭环供应链,考虑供应链成员面对市场需求不确定时表现出不同的风险态度,研究了闭环供应链的定价与回收决策问题。首先给出了产品的市场需求函数与回收商的回收成本函数;然后基于均值-方差法,构建了各成员和闭环供应链的效用函数;进一步地,依据博弈论的思想,确定了不同渠道权力结构下的最优零售价格、最优回收率和最优批发价格;最后分析了闭环供应链成员风险态度和贷款利率对供应链最优决策和效用的影响。研究表明,成员风险态度和贷款利率能够影响闭环供应链最优决策和效用,其中,风险规避的零售商和制造商对闭环供应链其他成员均有利,但是对自身和闭环供应链不利;风险规避的回收商对闭环供应链成员均不利;贷款利率的增长会降低成员和闭环供应链的效用。

This paper is focused on the pricing and recycling decisions of the closed-loop supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer, a recycler and a capital constrained retailer, considering the different risk attitudes of the manufacturer, the recycler and the retailer when the market demand is uncertain. First, the market demand function and the collection cost function are given. Then, according to mean-variance, the utility functions of participators and closed-loop supply chain are constructed. Furthermore, according to the game theory, the optimal retail price of retailer, the optimal return rate of recycler and the optimal wholesale price of manufacturer under different supply chain power structure can be determined. Finally, the impacts of the participators’ risk attitudes and loan rate on optimal policies and utilities of the supply chain are analyzed. The results shows that members’ risk attitudes and loan interest rate can affect the optimal decisions and utility of the closed-loop supply chain. Specifically, the risk averse retailer and the risk averse manufacture are beneficial to other members, but are harmful to themselves and the closed-loop supply chain. The risk averse recycler is harmful to the manufacture, the retailer and the recycler. The increase of loan interest rate can reduce the utilities of participators and closed-loop supply chain.