债务融资约束对上市公司过度投资的抑制作用研究

Research on the Restraining Effect of Debt Financing Constraints on Over Investment of Listed Companies

在公司管理层试图构建“经理人帝国”的过程中,进行过度投资、增大投资规模是扩大管理层权力的重要途径;而债务融资约束则会抑制企业投资并导致投资不足现象出现。基于中国A股上市公司2014—2018年财务和治理结构数据,运用异质性双边随机前沿估计方法对这一问题进行了实证研究。研究发现:管理层权力膨胀导致过度投资高于最优投资水平;债务融资约束使得投资支出低于最优投资水平;两者的净效应使实际投资支出低于最优投资水平。进一步将公司间的异质性纳入考察后发现:上市年限较长、董事会规模较大的公司对管理层权力的约束能力较强,而股权和薪酬激励都没有显著抑制管理层权力膨胀带来的过度投资行为;对于不同产权性质的分组研究表明,民营公司管理层权力膨胀受到的约束力更弱,而债务融资约束对投资支出的抑制效应在国有和民营公司之间无明显差异。

In the process of corporate management trying to build"manager Empire",over investment and increasing the scale of investment are important ways to expand the power of management,but debt financing constraints will inhibit corporate investment and lead to underinvestment.Based on the data of financial and governance structure of China's A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018,using the heterogeneity of bilateral stochastic frontier estimation method,the paper investigates this problem.The results show that:the over investment caused by the expansion of management power is higher than the optimal investment level;the debt financing constraint makes the investment expenditure lower than the optimal investment level;the net effect of the two makes the actual investment expenditure lower than the optimal investment level.This paper studies the heterogeneity among companies and finds that the companies with long listed years and large board of directors have strong constraint on the power of management,while equity and salary incentives do not significantly inhibit the over investment behavior.The grouping study of different property rights shows that the expansion of management power of private companies is constrained.However,there is no significant difference in the inhibitory effect of debt financing constraints on investment expenditure between state-owned and private companies.