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制度分析视阈下地方环境监测操纵行为生成逻辑——基于10个区县的实证研究 被引量:1

The Formation of Manipulative Behavior in the Implementation of Environment Monitoring Policy from the Institutional Perspective——An Empirical Study Based on Ten Counties in China
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摘要 地方环境监测是我国环保治理的重要举措,其现实运行受到制度和行政文化影响,其中蒙蔽性操纵行为是执行异化的突出表现之一。从制度分析视角,以环境监测站公职人员个体感知为基础,构建基层环境监测操纵行为分析框架和量表,利用来自苏、皖、豫三省10个样本区(县)的结构化问卷调查,检验基层环境监测操纵行为的发生机理和作用关系。研究发现,考核制度背景下,个体认知、内外约束、政策保障等因素共同影响考核对象环境监测行为。其中,当执行规则模糊、无法形成刚性约束认知时,基层组织及个体更可能以蒙蔽操纵手段回应考核目标;行政系统内外参与和信息公开披露状态对于基层考核对象行为产生实质影响,由此也引发环境监测政策透明的社会诉求。同时,上级部门实质性支持取向对于基层环境监测行为亦产生作用,明确精准的政策支持和惩戒机制可以形成必要的威慑约束,保障环境监测运行的有效性。 Local environmental monitoring is an essential measure for China’s environmental protection strategy, as is affected by the specific institutional norms and administrative culture.Among them, deceptive manipulation is one of the prominent phenomenon in the grass-roots implementation.From the perspective of institutional analysis and individual perception of staffs from environmental monitoring stations, this paper constructed an analysis framework and the testing scale.The questionnaire survey from 10 sample counties in Jiangsu, Anhui and Henan provinces were applied to explore the mechanism of manipulation behavior in environmental monitoring activities.It is found that the individual cognition, internal & external constraints and the supporting policy jointly affect the formation of environmental monitoring behavior.In specific,(1) when the enforcement rules are vague and unable to form constraint cognition, grass-roots sectors are more likely to respond by means of deception and manipulation;(2) the participation and disclosure of information inside and outside the administrative system have a substantial impact on the grass-roots behavior, which also leads to social demand for transparency of environmental monitoring policy;(3) the substantive support from the superior department plays a vital role in the implementation of environmental monitoring, and the accurate policy support and punishment mechanism can form deterrence to ensure the effectiveness of environmental monitoring at the grass-roots level.
作者 刘泽照 LIU Ze-zhao
出处 《中国地质大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第2期65-76,共12页 Journal of China University of Geosciences(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 国家社会科学基金项目“基于政策模拟实验的社会稳定风险演进及预控机制研究”(17BZZ039) 江苏师范大学人文社科基金项目“系统视角下城市应急响应协同机制研究”(18XWRS002)。
关键词 环境监测 操纵行为 制度分析 地方政府 治理 environment monitoring manipulative behavior institutional analysis local government governance
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