国有企业高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险——“有效管制”还是“过度约束”?

Executive Compensation and Stock Price Crash Risk:Effective Regulation or Excessive Restraint?

本文以2008~2018年A股国有企业上市公司为研究样本,从股价崩盘风险的视角,探讨国有企业不同时期薪酬管制政策究竟是有效管制还是过度约束。研究发现:在2008~2018年间,国有企业高管货币薪酬与股价崩盘风险显著正相关,在职消费与股价崩盘风险呈“U型”关系。整体而言,国有企业薪酬在管制背景下表现出过度约束的特征。结合不同样本期间的限薪政策研究发现,2009年“限薪令”颁布后高管货币薪酬与股价崩盘风险显著负相关,2012年“八项规定”颁布后高管在职消费与股价崩盘风险显著负相关,2015年“限薪令”颁布后,高管货币薪酬对股价崩盘风险的抑制效应并不明显。进一步的作用机制检验发现,2009年“限薪令”颁布后,高管货币薪酬政策通过降低国有高管的负面消息隐藏和盈余操纵水平而降低股价崩盘风险。2012年的“八项规定”颁布后,在职消费通过降低代理成本而降低股价崩盘风险,2009年和2012年的薪酬政策表现出“有效管制”效应,但2015年“限薪令”则表现出对高管货币薪酬的过度约束而无法发挥有效的激励效应。

Using the sample of A-share state-owned enterprises(SOEs)from the year 2008 to 2018,this paper discusses whether the compensation regulation is effective or excessive restraint in different periods from the perspective of the stock price crash risk.The results show that it is a significant positive correlation between the monetary compensation and the stock price crash risk in SOEs,and it is a U-shaped relationship between perks and the stock price crash risk from the year 2008 to 2018.On the whole,the salary in SOEs shows the characteristics of excessive restraint under the background of regulation.However,Considering the compensation limited policy of different sample periods,we find that the monetary compensations of top management are significantly negatively correlated with stock price crash risk after the"Compensation Limited Policy"in 2009.the perks of top management are significantly negatively correlated with stock price crash risk after the"Eight Rules"in 2012.The monetary compensations of top management are not significantly negatively correlated with stock price crash risk after the"Compensation Limited Policy"in 2015.Further mechanism test shows that the"Compensation Limited Policy"in 2009 weakens the positive relationship between the monetary compensations and the stock price crash risk by reducing the negative news hiding and earnings management.The"Eight Rules"in 2012 weakens the positive relationship between perks and the stock price crash risk by reducing agency costs.It indicates that the compensation limited policy shows"effective regulation"effect in 2009 and 2012,However,the"Compensation Limited Policy"in 2015 shows"excessive restraint"effect on monetary compensations,which can not exert effective incentive effects.