摘要
知觉问题在海德格尔学说研究领域中当属于十分冷僻的话题。究其缘由,一方面在于多数情况下海德格尔本人对于一般意义上的知觉理解持否定的态度并且很少对其做专门的阐述;另一方面则在于在研究者当中普遍接受了由此前这种表面现象所导致的一种刻板印象,即以为知觉问题在海德格尔这里不过是个已经被解构掉的"区域性"问题。事实上问题并非如此。无论对于承认或是不承认知觉问题对于海德格尔存在学说具有贯穿始终的特殊意义的研究者而言,他们无一例外都错过了对于vernehmen这个海德格尔称之为"知觉"的概念本身的把握和理解。而这正是本文找到的开启海德格尔学说中知觉问题大门的钥匙。
The topic of perception has been discussed rarely in the studies of Heidegger’s philosophy.Broadly speaking,there are two reasons for this:one is that Heidegger has always been critical of perception understood in general and in most situations seldom made a special statement on it;the other is that the researchers have generally accepted a stereotyped image arising from the superficial phenomenon which holds that the question about perception in Heidegger’s philosophy is just an deconstructed"regional"question.In reality,it is not the case.This paper concludes that for those who have either acknowledged or unacknowledged the significance of"perception"in Heidegger’s philosophy of existence have failed to understand the concept"Vernehmen"in Heidegger’s philosophy,which is the very focus in this paper.
作者
李知倚
LI Zhi-yi(Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《云南大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2021年第3期37-44,共8页
The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition
关键词
存在
知觉
此在
预期
物
海德格尔
Being
perception
Dasein
anticipation
thing
Heidegger